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ARGUMENT 
I. Adoption of defendants" idea of "reasonable inspection" 
would render it virtually impossible to bring a cause of 
action for fraudulent nondisclosure. 
There is no dispute that: (1) plaintiff inspected the 
swimming pool herself and hired a professional inspection company 
to inspect the pool for her; (2) the leaks at issue in this case 
were not visible and were in fact not discovered either by 
plaintiff or by her inspection company; and (3) the inspection 
report prepared by the inspection company was limited: 
Our review is limited to above ground or visible items only. 
It is an operational inspection of the accessible equipment 
and components and is therefore limited in scope. If 
concerned, client is advised to have a licensed pool company 
perform an in-depth review and/or service. 
(R.107)(emphasis added). 
The dispute in this case is over whether (in spite of the 
fact that there was no reason for her to be concerned) it was 
reasonable for plaintiff not to have an in-depth review of the 
pool by a licensed pool company. According to defendants, it was 
not. Defendants would have this Court determine when a buyer has 
exercised reasonable care in inspecting property as follows: 
"A buyer can decide the extent to which he will inspect the 
property. A buyer could choose not to even look at the 
property, or could choose to have all aspects of the 
property inspected. It is the buyer's choice; the buyer 
decides the level of risk that is acceptable to him. The 
seller is not a guarantor of all aspects of the home..." 
Brief of Appellee at page 7. 
Essentially, what defendants are asking this Court to accept 
is the proposition that unless the buyer performs an in-depth 
inspection of every aspect of the home, then, by definition, the 
1 
buyer has failed to exercise unreasonable care. That is not, as 
defendants suggest, the rule of law recognized by the Maack1 
court, nor any other court of which plaintiff is aware. And for 
good reason: it is difficult to conceive of a defective condition 
which could not be discovered by an in-depth inspection. The 
formula suggested by defendants would all but eliminate the cause 
of action for fraudulent nondisclosure, leaving the buyer to 
beware. 
Termite damage could easily be discovered by a professional 
termite inspector. Nonetheless, in Horsch v„ Terminix Intern. 
Co., 865 P.2d 1044, 1048-49 (Kan. App. 1993), a case cited with 
approval by this Court in Maack, the court held that termite 
damage was a material defect which the seller would be required 
to disclose. 
Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 551 
provides the following illustrations of cases warranting the 
imposition of liability for fraudulent nondisclosure 
notwithstanding the fact that the defective condition could be 
discovered by an in-depth inspection: 
3. A sells to B a dwelling house, without disclosing to B 
the fact that the house is riddled with termites. This is a 
fact basic to the transaction [which must be disclosed]. 
. . . • 
9. A sells B a dwelling house, without disclosing the fact 
that drain tile under the house is so constructed that at 
periodic intervals water accumulates under the house. A 
knows that B is not aware of this fact, that he could not 
1Maack v. Resource Design & Const., Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
2 
discover it by an ordinary inspection, and that he would not 
make the purchase if he knew it. A knows also that B 
regards him as an honest and fair man and one who would 
disclose any such fact if he knew it. A is subject to 
liability to B for his pecuniary loss in an action for 
deceit. 
(Emphasis added). Finally, comment 1 to section 551 provides the 
following example of a case where there is liability for 
nondisclosure: 
...a seller who knows that his cattle are infected with tick 
fever or contagious abortion is not free to unload them on 
the buyer and take his money, when he knows that the buyer 
is unaware of the fact, could not easily discover it, would 
not dream of entering into a bargain if he knew and is 
relying upon seller's good faith and common honesty to 
disclose any such fact if it is true. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 551, comment 1. 
Under each of the above sets of facts, the buyer would 
clearly be able to discover the defective condition by an in-
depth inspection of the property and, in defendants1 view, 
failing to do so would have no claim for fraudulent nondisclosure 
against the seller. As the cited authorities indicate, however, 
that is not the law. There is no question that termite damage 
could be discovered by a professional termite inspector. 
Nevertheless, the Kansas court in Horsch held that termite damage 
was a material fact which the seller would be required to 
disclose. 865 P.2d 1044, 1048-49. Similarly, there is no 
question that defectively constructed drain tile could be 
discovered by an "in-depth" inspection. Illustration 9 to 
section 551, however, finds liability where the defective 
construction could not be discovered by an "ordinary inspection." 
Finally, the fact that cattle are diseased could certainly be 
3 
discovered by a veterinarian's inspection. Again, however, 
comment 1 to section 551 states that the seller is "not free to 
unload them on the buyer and take his money." 
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the swimming pool 
leaks at issue could have been discovered by an in-depth 
inspection by a licensed pool company. They were not, however, 
visible and they were not discovered by plaintiff's personal 
inspections of the pool nor by her professional inspection 
company. Defendants, on the other hand, were well aware of the 
leaks and could have easily disclosed their existence,, 
II. The doctrine Of caveat emptor is not applicable to this 
case. 
Defendants' discussion of the doctrine of caveat emptor is 
superfluous. Defendants are either entitled to summary judgment 
in connection with plaintiff's fraudulent concealment/ fraudulent 
nondisclosure claim, or they are not. If they are, that is the 
end of the case. There is no reason to then go on and apply the 
doctrine of caveat emptor. On the other hand, if this Court 
determines that defendants owed plaintiff a duty to disclose the 
known defective condition of the swimming pool, caveat emptor is 
simply not an available defense. See Maack, supra, 875 P.2d at 
579 (a duty to disclose exists in a vendor-vendee transaction 
where a defect is not discoverable by reasonable care). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that she satisfied her duty 
to exercise reasonable care in inspecting the swimming pool. 
Accordingly, plaintiff requests that the trial court's Order 
4 
Granting Motion for Summary Judgment be reversed and that this 
case be remanded to the trial court for a trial on the merits. 
DATED this / J dky of December, 1999. 
Mitchell 
:orney for Appellants 
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